We describe an iterated game between two players, in which the payoff is to survive a number of steps.
Individual-Partner Pair Individual Payoff
Prisoner's Dilemma 
Hawk-Dove These four types of games defined by the shape ofẋ over the interval [0, 1] are identical to what is observed 175 in classical models of diploid viability selection (e.g. see section 4.2 in Nagylaki, 1992). The difference is that, 176 barring atypical phenomena such as meiotic drive (Dunn, 1953; Sandler and Novitsky, 1957) or segregationdistortion (Sandler and Hiraizumi, 1960; Hartl, 1974) , standard diploid models always have b(n) = c(n).
It is by allowing b(n) = c(n) that two-player games introduce the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which c(n) > a(n) and d(n) > b(n) but a(n) > d(n). In order to have c(n) > a(n) and d(n) > b(n) in a 180 standard diploid model it would be necessary to have a(n) < d(n). Accordingly, the Prisoner's Dilemma is Harmony Game involves no cooperative dilemma and presents no barrier to cooperation. 188 2. An n-step survival game between two players 189 Our survival game always includes n iterations and begins with a pair of individuals. In each step, both 190 might survive or one, the other or both might die. These same outcomes hold for the complete game, only 191 the probabilities of surviving will be smaller. We consider two unconditional strategies, A and B. When 192 both players are present, their individual survival probabilities are given by the single-step version of Table 1 193 with a(1) ≡ a, b(1) ≡ b, c(1) ≡ c and d(1) ≡ d. However, the next iteration must be faced by whoever 194 has survived so far, until all n iterations are done. Thus, an individual might have to play alone. Then the 195 survival probabilities become a 0 for A without a partner and d 0 for B without a partner. In all of what 196 follows, A will be the more cooperative strategy, meaning that a > d. 197 The n-step survival game is a stochastic process with six possible states: the paired states AA, AB and 198 BB, the loner states A and B, and the state in which both individuals have died which we denote Ø. It is 199 convenient to represent a single iteration using the matrix
with entries equal to the transition probabilities among the six states. For example, the transition from state Table 1 . 204 The process described by Eq. (3) is depicted in Fig. 2 . State Ø is an absorbing state. There is no 205 possibility of transition between the paired states AA, AB, and BB. Instead each of these feeds either 206 straight into state Ø, from which there is no escape, or into one of the loner states, A or B, and from 207 there into Ø. Therefore, transitions from any of the starting, paired states to absorption in state Ø involve 208 either one or two changes of state. Further, all of the transitions that cannot occur in a single iteration (the 209 0 entries in the matrix) cannot ever occur regardless of the number of iterations. Because of this simple 210 structure, the n-step transition probabilities can be calculated directly by conditioning on the times these 211 transitions take place, i.e. on their positions in the sequence of n iterations. It is also possible to compute 212 the n-step transition probabilities using standard techniques for Markov chains, and this provides a useful 213 framework for decomposing the process and describing its behavior when n is large. Details of the matrix approach are given in the Appendix, but two key features of it inform our presenta-215 tion. The first is the fact of the absorbing state (Ø) in which both individuals have died. It will be reached 216 eventually, meaning in the limit n → ∞. For large n the game process will be just the approach to this state.
217
Second, when n is large, the rate of approach to state Ø will be given by the largest non-unit eigenvalue of 218 the matrix in Eq. (3). Because it is an upper triangular matrix, the eigenvalues are simply the entries on the 219 diagonal. By convention, we call the largest of these λ 1 = 1 and note that this corresponds to the eventual 220 absorption in state Ø. In all, we have λ = 1, a 2 , bc, d 2 , a 0 , d 0 .
(4)
Following the discussion of Table 1 and Eq. 1, we expect the fates of A and B in this iterated game to 222 depend on the relative magnitudes of a versus c and b versus d. Equation (4) suggests that their fates will 223 also depend on the relative magnitudes of the pair survival probabilities, a 2 , bc and d 2 , and on the loner 224 survival probabilities, a 0 and d 0 , and that this dependence may be especially strong when n is large. 225 We compute the n-step pair survival probabilities directly as
Then, by considering the possibility that one of the individuals might die in step 1 ≤ i ≤ n and the other 227 individual survives to the end of the game, we have
The only other possibility is that neither individual survives, so we also have the death of A in this partnership also represents a rather direct disadvantage to A. In order to understand 239 whether A or B will prevail in evolution, it is necessary to account for the full dynamics of reproduction in 240 a population, with fitnesses are determined by this game. We will take this up in Section 3.
241
In the n-step game, the differences a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n) give the conditions under which A is 242 favored. The n-step payoffs, or survival probabilities, are computed by accounting for the two ways an 
The transitions AA → A and BB → B are adjusted by a factor of 1/2 because they are equally likely to 246 happen by the death of the partner as by the death of the focal individual. Equations (19) through (22) 247 are our general results, namely the n-step survival probabilities for individuals of type A and B given each 248 kind of initial partnership. They are exact for any values of a, b, c, d, a 0 and d 0 greater than zero and less 249 than one, and for any number of iterations n ≥ 1. As expected, when n = 1, they reduce to the single-step 250 survival probabilities a(1) = a, b(1) = b, c(1) = c and d(1) = d.
251
The two key differences in payoff are then
Each term in Eqs. (23) and (24) includes a factor λ n i for one of the non-unit eigenvalues (a 2 , bc, d 2 , a 0 , d 0 ).
253
These factors are positive. The denominator of each term is the difference between two eigenvalues. If 254 we know the eigenvalues, we know whether the denominators are positive or negative. In some cases the 255 numerator might be negative, but by the definition of a, b, c, d, a 0 and d 0 as probabilities, the numerator 256 will be positive if the denominator is positive. Thus Eqs. (23) and (24) are written so that the sign of each 257 term indicates whether it favors A (+) or disfavors A (−) when the denominator is positive. We do this to 258 facilitate the analysis of large n, in which case a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n) will come to be dominated by the 259 terms involving the largest non-unit eigenvalue.
260
Another way to write Eqs. (23) and (24) is for predicting the structure of the game when n is large. 
Four types of prolonged survival games
Here, we present analytical results for large n and use our exact results to illustrate how the prospects 281 for A depend on n for intermediate values. The analysis of large n allows us to answer questions such as:
282
Is there a number of iterations beyond which A is unambiguously favored? More generally, we ask how the 283 game might change for A, for better or for worse, as the number of iterations increases. We present results 284 both for a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n) and in terms of the unified predictions of Eq. (1).
285
Equation (1) is a standard replicator equation for a symmetric two-player game. In the Appendix, we 286 show how it may be derived for the n-step survival game. This has two notable features: the game works by 287 removing individuals from the population instead of affecting their rates of reproduction and the derivation 288 follows pairs of individuals rather than single individuals. Also in the Appendix, we take a discrete-time, 289 population-genetic approach to show that the change in frequency of A over one generation is
which is identical in form toẋ in Eq.
(1) but scaled by the average fitness,w. Equation (27) is directly 291 comparable to classical results for diploid viability selection. Importantly,w > 0. Therefore, all of the 292 conclusions concerning the ultimate fate of the cooperative type A in the population, based on the sign of 293 the change in frequency, will be the same whether one appeals to Eq. (1) or Eq. (27).
294
Each of the n-step payoffs a(n), b(n), c(n) and d(n) depends on two of the non-unit eigenvalues, and 295 each eigenvalue is raised to the power n. Thus a(n), b(n), c(n) and d(n) all decrease to zero as n tends 296 to infinity. Surviving more steps is less likely than surviving fewer steps. As a consequence, the two key 297 fitness differences, a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n), and the instantaneous rate of change,ẋ, also approach zero 298 in the limit n → ∞. We study the approach to this neutral limit in order to understand whether increasing 299 n fundamentally alters the prospects for cooperation. For example, ifẋ < 0 when n = 1 but the neutral 300 limitẋ = 0 is approached from above, then there exists a value of n beyond whichẋ > 0. In this case, the 301 single-step game favors the non-cooperative type B but large-n games favor the cooperative type A.
302
In the following subsections, we describe four main categories of large-n, or prolonged, survival games.
303
These are characterized both in the usual way by the relative values of a, b, c and d, that is by the structure 304 of the single-step game, and by the rank order of non-unit eigenvalues a 2 , bc, d 2 , a 0 and d 0 . We have defined 305 the cooperative strategy A throughout by a > d, which guarantees that a 2 > d 2 . Thus d 2 will never be the 306 largest non-unit eigenvalue. The first two types of prolonged survival games we describe are those for which 307 a 2 is the largest and those for which bc is the largest. The third and fourth types of prolonged survival 308 games are ones in which lone individuals survive with high probability. Simplifications emerge when n is 309 large because the n-step payoffs become dominated by their largest terms. We present approximations for 310 large n, showing just the leading terms of a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n), and ofẋ.
Games in which cooperation will prevail 312
The first case we consider is when having a partner significantly enhances survival and it is the AA 313 type not the AB type that survives best. This is case in which a 2 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue: 314 a 2 > bc, a 0 , d 0 . Thus, the probability that both members of an AA pair survive a single iteration is greater 315 than the corresponding probability for any other pair and for either type of lone individual.
316
The condition a 2 > bc may be true of any kind of two-player game, but the chance it is depends on the 317 game. One way to quantify this is to consider the total parameter space of two-player, single-step survival 318 games. Because a, b, c and d are probabilities and here it is assumed that a > d, this space is equal to half 319 of a four-dimensional hypercube. Further, since a > d implies a 2 > d 2 , there are just three possible relations 320 of the pair-state eigenvalues, a 2 , bc and d 2 . Either bc > a 2 , a 2 > bc > d 2 or d 2 > bc. The latter two satisfy 321 the condition a 2 > bc. Table 2 lists the proportions of the total parameter space satisfying the criteria for 322 each type of single-step game. In addition, Table 2 shows the percentages of the game-specific parameter 323 regions corresponding to each of the three possible relations of the pair-state eigenvalues. So, for example,
324
90% of PD-type games have a 2 > bc, compared to 20% of HD-type games.
325
Order of Pair-State Eigenvalues When the single-step game is a canonical Prisoner's Dilemma, it is always true that a 2 > bc. This is due 326 to the assumption that the reward payoff must be larger than the average of the temptation payoff and the 327 sucker's payoff (see, e.g. Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1984) , in which case we have
In what follows, it will be important to know which is the second-largest non-unit eigenvalue, especially 329 in the consideration of finite populations in Section 4. Thus, the two cases a 2 > bc > d 2 and d 2 > bc are 330 distinguished in Table 2 . We find that canonical Prisoner's Dilemmas are 40% a 2 > bc > d 2 and 60% d 2 > bc.
If we also require that the punishment payoff must be less than the average of the temptation payoff and the sucker's payoff (e.g. see p. 219 of Cressman, 2005), this 40 : 60 split is reversed.
333
It would be possible to expand Table 2 by including a 0 and d 0 and integrating over the six-dimensional 334 space of all parameters. There would be more than three relations among the five non-unit eigenvalues. We 335 do not pursue this here. For the prolonged games considered in this section and in Section 3.2, it is taken 336 for granted that neither a 0 nor d 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue. In contrast, in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 it is 337 taken for granted that one of a 0 or d 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue or they both are and they are equal.
338
If we were to include a 0 and d 0 in Table 2 , we expect they would often be larger than a 2 and bc due to the 339 fact that these pair-state eigenvalues are products of probabilities.
340
There is just one term in Eqs. (19) through (22) which includes the factor a 2n , corresponding to what is 341 assumed here to be the largest non-unit eigenvalue, a 2 . It is in the expression for a(n). Thus, we have
when n is very large. Equation (29) gives the approximate value of a(n) − c(n) as it approaches zero in 343 the limit n → ∞. This result shows that whatever value or sign a(1) − c(1) = a − c might have in a single 344 iteration, there exists a value of n above which a(n) − c(n) will be greater than zero.
345
The leading term in the other key difference, b(n) − d(n), will depend on which of bc, d 2 , a 0 or d 0 is 346 the next-largest eigenvalue. Consider, for example, a game which strongly enhances survival, such that 347 a 2 , bc, d 2 > a 0 , d 0 . If bc is the next largest eigenvalue after a 2 , then from Eq. (24) we have
In this case, the large-n game becomes a Harmony Game in which A is unambiguously favored. On the other 349 hand, if the second largest eigenvalue is d 2 , then from Eq. (24) we have
In this case, the large-n game becomes or remains a Stag Hunt game, so A does not become unambiguously 351 favored. The chances of being in either of these two sub-cases are given in Table 2 . Similar arguments can 352 be applied when a 0 or d 0 is the second-largest non-unit eigenvalue. Then Eq. (24) shows that for large n,
Regardless of which is the second-largest non-unit eigenvalue, if a 2 is the largest then a(n) − c(n) will be 355 much greater than b(n) − d(n) when n is large. This may be expressed as
Thus, when n is very large, the advantage in survival that A has over B when the partner is A will be much 357 greater than whatever difference there is in survival between A and B when the partner is B. One may argue from an evolutionary standpoint that the large-n Stag Hunt game, with a(n) − c(n) in Eq. (29) and b(n) − d(n) in Eq. (31), will be a very relaxed cooperative dilemma. Specifically, owing to Eq. (32), a large-n 360 Stag Hunt of this sort will have its unstable polymorphic equilibriumx in Eq.
(2) close to zero, with the 361 result that A will be favored over most of the range of x.
362
Finally, when n is very large the replicator equation, Eq.
(1), becomes
We conclude that, if n is large enough in the case of this first type of prolonged survival game, the more 364 cooperative type A will be uniformly favored in an infinite population. This result requires only that a 2 is the 365 largest non-unit eigenvalue. It is robust to differences in the loner survival probabilities a 0 and d 0 . As long 366 as a 2 is large enough, the non-cooperative type B cannot be rescued by an advantage in loner survivability.
367 Table 2 shows that a 2 > bc for the great majority of possible single-step survival games, the exception being 368 games of the Hawk-Dove type, of which only 20% will have this property. grows it becomes a game in which A is uniformly favored, as in the Harmony Game (HG). 
0.05 Figure 3B displays results for a very similar game, but one in which the single-iteration probabilities of individual survival are shifted closer to 1 by a factor of 1/2. That is, a = 0.9, b = 0.8, c = 0.95, d = 0.85 380 and a 0 = d 0 = 0.65. Now the eigenvalues are a 2 = 0.81, bc = 0.76, d 2 = 0.7225, a 0 = 0.65 and d 0 = 0.65.
Number of Iterations, n Payoff Difference

381
Overall, the picture is similar to Figure 3A , with the three phases PD then SH then HG. But now in moving 382 from n = 1 to n = 2, the selection against A becomes stronger rather than weaker. This is more in line with 383 the usual notion of iterated games, in which payoffs are assumed to accrue additively. In survival games, 384 however, this decrease cannot continue because all games become neutral as n approaches infinity. Fig. 5A , the next-largest eigenvalue is d 2 , so b(n) − d(n) will 416 remain negative. However, as can already be seen in the figure, it will be much smaller in magnitude than 417 a(n) − c(n). In the Hawk-Dove game of Fig. 5B , the next-largest eigenvalue is bc, so b(n) − d(n) will remain 418 positive. But since a 2 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, a(n) − c(n) will become positive (when n = 615, 419 from numerical solution) and eventually will become much larger than b(n) − d(n). Another way to view the results presented in Figs. 3, 4 and 5 is in terms ofẋ rather than a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n). Figure 6 shows this for the examples of Fig. 4 . Now the overall shape ofẋ can be seen as 422 it moves from n = 1, where it is a Prisoner's Dilemma identical to what is depicted in Fig. 1 .1D, to n = 60, 423 where it is a Harmony Game. In both panels, the thick contour line tracesẋ = 0, showing the polymorphic 424 equilibrium in Eq. (2) when it exists. In Fig. 6A , this equilibrium enters at x = 0 and exits at x = 1. In 425 between, the shape ofẋ is like that of Fig. 1.1F , namely similar to the Hawk-Dove game in which A is favored 426 when rare and disfavored when common. In Fig. 6B , the equilibrium enters at x = 1 and exits at x = 0.
427
Here the shape ofẋ for intermediate n is like that of Fig. 1.1E , namely similar to the Stag Hunt in which 428 A is disfavored when rare and favored when common. Note that although a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n) vary 429 non-monotonically in these cases (Fig. 4) , the equilibriumx is monotonic in n. For simplicity of presentation, we plot the surface as a smooth function of n, whereas in reality it is discrete. Here we consider the case that the game enhances survival significantly and it is AB that fares best.
440
Thus, bc is the largest non-unit eigenvalue. Table 2 shows that this will occur most readily when the single- (2) for each value of n. Note that the viewpoints and the ranges of n for the two panels are different.
canonical assumption a > (b + c)/2 is violated. It will not occur when the single-step game is a Stag Hunt.
443
Here, again, we assume that having a partner significantly enhances survival, so bc > a 0 , d 0 .
444
There are two terms in Eqs. (19) through (22) which include the factor (bc) n . They are in the expressions 445 for b(n) and c(n). For very large n we have
Thus, survival games of this sort either stay or become Hawk-Dove games as n increases. In addition, 447 a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n) will be of the same order of magnitude as n tends to infinity. In the previous Prisoner's Dilemma at n = 1, such that bc rather than a 2 is largest non-unit eigenvalue, the n-step game 453 will eventually become a Hawk-Dove game rather than a Harmony Game.
454
When bc is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, the large-n approximation for the change in frequency is
We deduce that, for large n,ẋ > 0 if x <x bc andẋ < 0 if x >x bc , where
only one individual survives, it is the A individual. For reference, if a 0 and d 0 are both very small, then 458 Eq. (37) reduces to b/(b + c). If the population frequency of A is smaller than this probability in Eq. (37), 459 then A is favored, otherwise it is disfavored. This cutoff is of course equal to the limiting (n → ∞) value of 460 Eq.
(2) when bc is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, which is stable in this case. Hawk-Dove game with a stable polymorphic equilibrium (the thick contour line) as n increases, even as the 464 game first intensifies for intermediate n then approaches neutrality for large n. 
Games ruled by loner survivability 466
In both of the previous sections, it was assumed that having a partner provided a substantial boost to 467 survival. In this section and the next, we consider cases in which having a partner does not enhance survival.
468
If either a lone A or a lone B has the highest probability of surviving each iteration of the game, then either 469 a 0 or d 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue. Two terms in Eqs. (19) through (22) include the factor a n 0 -they 470 are in the expressions for a(n) and b(n)-and two terms include the factor d n 0 -they are in the expressions 471 for c(n) and d(n). If a 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, then for very large n we have
and if d 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, we have
Thus, if single individuals of one type have a higher probability of survival than single individuals of the 474 other type and than any pair of individuals, that type will become favored in the population as the num- not enhance survival but the two-player game may still provide an advantage to one strategy or the other.
481
In this case a 0 = d 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue. When n is very large, using Eqs. (23) and (24) and 482 substituting a 0 for d 0 , we have
Whether these differences are greater or less than zero will depend on which of the two terms in the brackets to zero. Then, neglecting terms of a 2 , bc and d 2 which will be even smaller, Eqs. (42) and (43) become 490 a(n) − c(n) ≈ a n−1
Thus, with a strong deficit, the results for large n will be of the same type as the results for n = 1.
491
When the deficit is milder, no simple approximations for Eqs. (42) and (43) are available, but numerical 492 analysis shows that the conclusions of Section 3.1 can be reversed. Figure 9 shows two examples of how changes directly from a Hawk-Dove game into a Prisoner's Dilemma as n increases. Thus, when having a partner does not significantly enhance survival but does cause payoff differences-and is the only source of these differences-there is no expectation that the prospects for cooperation will improve as the number of 499 iterations increases. These cooperative dilemmas may intensify rather than becoming more relaxed. 
Evolutionary dynamics in a finite population 501
All populations are finite, so changes in the frequency of A will be stochastic rather than deterministic.
502
Here we describe these changes for a particular population model and check the validity of our previous 503 conclusions based on the deterministic predictions forẋ (or ∆x). In a finite population, x is discrete, not 504 continuous. If N is the population size and K is the number of A individuals, then K ∈ (0, 1, . . . , N − 1, N ) 505 and x ∈ (0, 1/N, . . . , (N − 1)/N, 1). We study the process of jumps in K or x when both death and 506 reproduction are stochastic. We continue to assume that the survival game is the only source of fitness 507 differences and that the population is well-mixed in the sense that partners are chosen at random. an individual is chosen, now based on its fitness, either to reproduce or to die. 515 We, instead, consider a model in which two randomly chosen individuals play the survival game. Players 516 are chosen without replacement from the population. This precludes self-interaction, which is appropriate 517 because we wish to model two individuals being sequestered from the rest of the population for a period of 518 time. When the n iterations of the game are finished, both individuals may be alive, one may be alive or both 519 may be dead. This is the only source of death in the population and the only place in the life cycle where selection acts. In each time step, these 0, 1 or 2 deaths are compensated by the same number of births.
521
All individuals have an equal chance to reproduce, including the two who play the game. Thus, parents 522 are sampled at random with replacement from the population. Finally, offspring inherit their parent's type 523 without modification, i.e. there is no mutation.
524
Let K be the current number of A individuals. After one time step, the number is K , which will differ of the game and one for the sampling of parents. In all, we have
Although this process is not as simple as the standard Moran process, for which a number of exact results 531 are available (Moran, 1962), as a pentadiagonal matrix it may still be amenable to study. Following our 532 previous analysis ofẋ, we focus on the change in the number of cooperators, ∆K = K − K, in particular 533 on the sign and magnitude of E[∆K] which measures the direction and strength of selection.
534
The expected value of ∆K is given by 
with a(n), b(n), c(n), d(n) as before in Eqs. (1). We define the selection coefficient 540 s(n; K) = a(n) . When the mutation rate is small, these two approaches become identical.
555
In Section 3, we usedẋ > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1) as a criterion for A being unambiguously favored. The 556 analogue here is E[∆x] > 0 for all x ∈ (1/N, . . . , (N − 1)/N ). We take this to be a more stringent criterion 557 than the one based on fixation probabilities. However, from Eqs. (52) and (53), it is clear that even when 558 AA survives best and a 2 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, it will not necessarily be true that E[∆x] > 0 for 559 all x ∈ (1/N, . . . , (N − 1)/N ). In particular, for the two terminal frequencies, we have 560 s(n;
and 561 s(n;
When there is only a single A individual, the possible benefit of the AA pair is unrealized. At the other 562 extreme, when there is only one B individual, it is the BB pair that does not matter.
563
Therefore, even when a 2 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, it will always be possible to find a population 564 size small enough that A remains disfavored even as n tends to infinity. In particular, if the population 565 consists of just two individuals, there is only one polymorphic frequency, K = N − K = 1, and we have 
which will not in general be favorable to A. To illustrate, if we make the simplifying assumption that the 568 loner fitnesses are the same (a 0 = d 0 ), then Eq. (57) reduces to
When n = 1, this is simply b − c. Then as n becomes large, regardless of which eigenvalue (bc or a 0 = d 0 ) 570 is larger, the sign of b(n) − c(n) will be the same as the sign of b − c. One of the ways in which a game and increasing n will hold. Just the opposite: A will be disfavored.
574
While there is no expectation that conclusions from an infinite-population model will be accurate for 575 small populations, we expect their heuristic value to hold for moderately large N . In what follows, we focus 576 on N 1. We begin as before by noting that our finite-population model collapses to a neutral Moran model 577 in the limit n → ∞, although it would be one in which pairs of individuals rather than single individuals 578 are chosen to die and to reproduce. Again, we answer the question about A being favored by studying the 579 approach to this neutral limit. In our finite-population model, this neutral limit is E[∆x] = 0. Then if, for 580 example, E[∆x] < 0 when n = 1 but the neutral limit E[∆x] = 0 is approached from above, then there 581 exists a value of n above which E[∆x] > 0. We briefly reconsider each type of prolonged game.
582
Case I, reconsidered. This is the case in which a 2 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue and cooperation is 583 expected to prevail. The finite-population result corresponding to Eq. (33) is 584 s(n; K) ≈ a 2n a − a 0 a 2 − a 0 K − 1 N − 1 > 0 for K = 2, . . . , N − 1.
Thus, for n large enough, E[∆x] > 0 for every frequency x = K/N except for one. We must investigate K = 1 585 because, for a given large value of n, even though a(n) may dominate all other terms when K = 2, . . . , N − 1, 586 it is only b(n), c(n) and d(n) that appear in s(n; K = 1) in Eq. (54). When n is large the sign and magnitude 587 of s(n; K = 1) will be determined by the second largest non-unit eigenvalue. We consider the same two 588 possibilities as before, namely when either bc or d 2 is next-largest eigenvalue, and we continue to assume 589 that the loner survival probabilities, a 0 and d 0 are small by comparison.
590
If the next largest eigenvalue is bc, then for K = 1 we have 591 s(n;
For very small N it could be that Eq. (60) is negative, but it will be positive for any moderate to large N , If the second-largest non-unit eigenvalue is d 2 , we have 596 s(n;
and E[∆x] < 0 when x = 1/N . But, again, for large n it will also be true that d 2n a 2n , so the magnitude 597 of the selection coefficient against A when K = 1 will be small compared to selection coefficients in favor of
598
A for every other value of K. We state without proof that in this case, if n is large enough, the probability 599 of fixation of A starting from a single copy should be greater than the neutral probability 1/N , and the 600 probability of loss of A starting from N − 1 copies should be less than 1/N . We conclude that A should be 601 considered favored in this case as well.
602
Situations in which one of the loner survival probabilities, a 0 or d 0 , is the second largest eigenvalue can 603 be treated similarly. We do not pursue this in detail, but in Case III below we consider the possibility that 604 one of these is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, and from that we can infer that nothing beyond the two 605 possibilities above for s(n; K = 1) will arise. That is, as n grows, s(n; K = 1) will be either positive or 606 negative but will be very small compared to s(n; K) which is positive for K = 2, . . . , N − 1. Thus, the 607 conclusion that A becomes favored when a 2 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue still holds.
608
Case II, reconsidered. This is the case in which bc is the largest non-unit eigenvalue and the game tends to 609 preserve the less cooperative strategy. The finite-population result corresponding to Eq. (36) is
Thus, the terminal frequencies x = 1/N and x = 1 − 1/N do not require a separate treatment as they did 611 under Case I. Here, just as in the infinite-population model, increasing n will not fundamentally alter the 612 game. Selection pressure will tend to keep both A and B in the population.
613
Case III, reconsidered. This is the case in which a 0 or d 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue. For these games 614 ruled by loner survivability, we have
if a 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue, and 616 s(n;
if d 0 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue. The conclusions are unchanged in the modified Moran model relative to the infinite-population model. Whichever type survives best alone becomes favored when n is large.
with a pairwise survival deficit, we have
in general, and
when the deficit is strong. If K = 1, the first terms in the parentheses in Eqs. 
634
Survival is an appropriate, direct measure of payoff (or utility) in evolution. Our analysis is similar to the 635 analysis of diploid population-genetic models in that we have described interactions between individuals only 636 in terms of fitness. What we have called strategies correspond to the alleles in a diploid population-genetic 637 model. We have assumed that individuals' strategies are fixed, meaning the same in every step of the game.
These results may be understood with reference to Eqs. (25) and (26), with a 0 = d 0 . In the case of Fig. 10A , a − a 0 = c − d 0 = but, owing to the eigenvalues, the positive increment a − a 0 is weighed more heavily 684 than the negative increment c − d 0 when n ≥ 2, so Eq. (25) gives a(n) − c(n) > 0 for n ≥ 2. Equation (26) 685 gives b(n) − b(n) = 0 because b − a 0 = d − d 0 = 0. Analogous arguments explain the case of Fig. 10B . In 686 sum, the more-cooperative A is favored if it unilaterally increases the survival of its partner (Fig. 10A) and 687 the less-cooperative B is favored if it unilaterally decreases the survival of its partner (Fig. 10B) .
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Equal-Payoff Model with A-Partner Increment:
Equal-Payoff Model with B-Partner Decrement: Table 3 : Two models in which individuals of type A and B have the same single-step probability of survival given the type of their partner, but in which the survival probability of any individual depends on the partner's type. The format is as in Table 1 but with an additional column for the case in which an individual no longer has a partner. In the first model, having a partner of type A boosts the probability of survival of both types of individuals by an amount above background (d 0 ). In the second model, having a partner of type B lowers the probability of survival of both types of individuals by an amount . For the second example, we design an iterated survival game which expresses key ideas behind Model 2 of pair of individuals. The individuals are identical in most respects. There is a public good which benefits all individuals equally, if it is preserved against attack. Each individual also has some private good which may 692 benefit its partner too, but again only if it is preserved against attack. The difference is that cooperators 693 (A) pay a cost and are immune to attacks whereas defectors (B) pay no cost and are susceptible to attacks. 694 Thus, defectors may benefit when they are paired with cooperators. This is not a survival game because 695 individuals do not die in the attacks. It is Markovian only in that each attack hits one member of the 696 pair randomly with probability 1/2. Nonetheless, this behavioral and ecological model has roughly similar 697 outcomes to those we have described here, when n corresponds to the number of attacks.
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Consider a survival game in which the probability an individual survives each attack, or iteration, depends 699 on its type and its partner's type as follows.
A alone:
Here u is the cost of being a cooperator, v is the benefit an individual receives when its partner is a cooperator If a 2 is the largest non-unit eigenvalue then a(n) − c(n) will eventually become 708 positive, and if bc is the next-largest eigenvalue then b(n) − d(n) will also eventually become positive.
709
A strong criterion for partnerships enhancing survival would be that a 2 , bc and d 2 are all greater than 710 d 0 . A weak criterion would be that only a 2 > d 0 . If we adopt the strong criterion and further assume that 711 a 2 , bc > d 2 , then the game would enhance survival if d 2 > d 0 . This implies that
We have assumed throughout that a, b, c and d are all less than one, so it must also be true that
For the sake of illustration, set g equal to the midpoint between these two extremes, so that g = (1 + √ d 0 − 714 v)/2 − d 0 . Assume further that v > u, which means that the single-step game is a Prisoner's Dilemma.
715
Using the particular values d 0 = 0.8, u = 0.02 and v = 0.03 gives the survival game shown in Table 4 . 
One would not immediately guess that the more cooperative type A would ever be favored in such a 717 game. But as Fig. 11 illustrates, this does become true as the number of attacks increases. For n ≥ 32 718 both a(n) − c(n) and b(n) − d(n) are greater than zero, though clearly the prolonged game yields rather 719 weak selection in this particular example. Note that we have not granted A any obvious advantage. As Rather than considering that individuals might change their strategies between steps of the game in 725 response to their partners, we have focused on the evolution of hardwired, non-reactive strategies within 726 populations. Among other results, we find the conditions under which cooperation will increase in frequency Corresponding to the matrix in Eq. 3, we define the stochastic matrix
Number of Iterations, n Payoff Difference
whose entries are the transition probabilities between the six possible states (AA, AB, BB, A, B, Ø). Thus, M describes a Markov process with a single absorbing state (Ø). When this is iterated n times, the probabilities of each of the six possible outcomes will be the entries of the n-step transition probability matrix M n . Because M is a triangular matrix, its eigenvalues are given by its diagonal elements. These are just the probabilities of remaining in each states over a single iteration. For reference, we reproduce Eq. (4) λ = 1, a 2 , bc, d 2 , a 0 , d 0 (76) and further note that λ 2 , λ 3 and λ 4 are the probabilities that both individuals survive the iteration. Under 736 the assumption that neither surviving nor perishing of individuals is guaranteed over a single iteration, which 737 is to say 1 > a, b, c, d, a 0 , d 0 > 0, λ 1 = 1 is the largest eigenvalue and 1 > λ 2 , λ 3 , λ 4 , λ 5 , λ 6 > 0. 
for each i ∈ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), then M n may be expressed in terms of its spectral decomposition
in which T denotes the transpose. With λ defined as above, the corresponding right and left eigenvectors of 
which is identical to Eq. (1) but now with payoffs from the n-step game.
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Classical population-genetic model 
